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The paper departs from the moment in early 2015 when people coming north on the Balkan 
route reached the Hungarian-Serbian border and strives to reconstruct how the social discourses 
in a border village developed. The latter involved imbuing the undefined foreigners with 
threatening and dehumanizing meanings and suspension of the primary reactions, which 
included compassion and suspicion to the same extent. Two dimensions of the discourses that 
developed are distinguished: one in everyday talk, and the other in public speech involving 
both politics and media.  
In the analysis, three interlinked perspectives are applied: a discursive approach which 
strives to follow the genesis of a discourse involving threats caused by migration that involved 
suspending compassion and dehumanizing migrants; an institutionalist approach applied to 
understand the interactions of the local, national, and transnational agents that contributed to 
the development of the hegemony of fear; and, finally, a structural approach that explains the 
background of social anxieties and how these were manipulated by discourses of fear and 
security.  
The argumentation will be developed in five sections. The first presents the methods 
and the field of the empirical investigation: a Hungarian border village situated on the Balkan 
migratory route. The second introduces the conceptual and political framework which helps 
with understanding both the social background as well as the discursive realization of a politics 
of fear and security. This is continued in the third part by a presentation of how the politics of 
fear and security initiated by the local far-right in interaction with national and international 
actors was built up in Ásotthalom. The fourth section employs a structuralist approach to 
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understand how the responsiveness to securitization can be explained by the social anxieties of 
the locals. The fifth part includes ethnographic verification and illustrates the previous sections 
by investigating discourse-based ethnographic encounters to show how curiosity, compassion, 
and solidarity were suspended and dehumanizing discourses became embedded in everyday 
talk. Thus, although the Hungarian border village is at the centre of our ethnographic 
examination, it should not be taken as an isolated entity: interactions between local, national, 
and transnational agents and structures should be considered in combination to understand how 
the border spectacle and dehumanization of migrants are connected to a more general de-
legitimization of transnational solidarity that supports the renewal of national border regimes.  
1. Research methods and field 
In recent years, a significant number of individuals and institutions have offered donations and 
engaged in volunteer work for refugees in Hungary, as in other countries on the European 
migratory route. Scholars have proven that the motivation for such acts of solidarity is also 
very similar; moreover, that these acts of solidarity entailed a process of increasing public 
awareness and responsibility (Feischmidt and Zakariás 2019). Nevertheless, the Hungarian 
public has been less influenced by solidarity than by security concerns. The international and 
the national media coverage of Hungary during the so-called refugee crisis of 2015 was also 
more focused on securitizing discourses and their role in propping up an authoritarian regime 
in Europe. However, we know very little about the socio-political circumstances and the 
concrete modalities concerning how the discourses of fear and the migration menace developed 
and spread throughout society.  
The aim of my research is to address this gap: to help understand the dynamics – the 
creation, perpetuation, and alteration – of xenophobia and solidarity in a local context which 
was deeply affected both by migration and far-right politics. Initially, two settlements, each 
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located on a different side of the Serbian-Hungarian border were the focus of inquiry. This 
paper discusses only the case of the Hungarian village of Ásotthalom. Nevertheless, at some 
points I make comparisons involving data from the Serbian village (Szerbhorváth 2016). 
The research adopted an ethnographic approach and was effectuated through seven field 
visits that took place between July 2015 and December 2017. During these visits – the length 
of which varied between four and ten days – I took part in public events such as Sunday masses, 
cultural festivals and commemorations, communal meetings, and observed everyday 
communication acts. I conducted interviews with local councillors, current and former mayors, 
the heads of local public institutions (kindergartens, schools, cultural centres, etc.), leaders and 
members of local ethno-cultural associations, owners, managers and employees at three 
agricultural companies which are the most important employers in the village, the priest and 
the lay leader of the local Catholic church, members of choir and the rosary group, the leader 
of the only oppositional party, the local doctor, owners and employees of the two local pubs, 
and one professional and two volunteer border guards. I made repeated visits to two families 
living in the close vicinity of the border. All interviews were transcribed and analyzed together 
with the notes taken during the fieldwork. The ethnographic fieldwork was supplemented by 
online ethnography of the public Facebook activity of the main actors and the national as well 
as international media coverage of the village.  
2. Politics of fear and discourses of threat: conceptual approaches 
Civic forms of solidarity with refugees during the long summer of migration and its aftermath 
can be understood (and are understood by the editors and authors of the current special issue) 
as reactions to a crisis of institutional forms of solidarity (Schwiertz and Schwenken 2020) that 
culminated in the “organized non-responsibility” of most EU Member States in 2015 (Pries 
2019, 3). Earlier studies have drawn attention to the challenges that solidarity – originally, 
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mostly framed by national institutions and perceptions – was exposed to because of the increase 
in ethnic and cultural diversity (Oosterlynk et al. 2015; Bauböck and Scholten 2016). This 
paper adds to this another form of challenging diversification related to the political inclusion 
of underprivileged regions whose populations, because of their own disenfranchisement and 
different historical trajectories, have hesitate to join the community of the responsible. 
Hesitation and ambivalent reactions have represented fertile soil in which political alternatives 
could take root, restricting responsibilities to the national level and suspending moral and 
political obligations towards those not belonging to the latter. This may be understood as a re-
nationalization of solidarity from below. Nevertheless, as this paper will argue, this process 
does not involve a legitimate form of solidarity but rather concerns the elimination of solidarity 
as justified both by long-term dispossession and newly arising threats deployed by politicians 
who promise security and the solidification of physical borders and mental boundaries. 
Scholars of the radical- and far-right recognized long ago the significance of discourses 
that react to and perpetuate social threats and feelings of insecurity. Securitization, as the 
constructivist approach in security studies has defined it (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998; 
Huymans 2006), involves the discursive construction of threats as essential to the formation, 
expansion, and reinforcement of power and control legitimized in terms of protection. 
Securitization is a form of governance that – as Fassin claims – links the construction of (state) 
borders to the production of (social) boundaries (Fassin 2011). In many countries security-led 
governance has emerged in parallel with the discourse about the “crisis of migration” or “crisis 
of multiculturalism,” and is tightly connected to the rise of the far-right. As Ruth Wodak has 
observed, the so-called normalization or mainstreaming of the far-right also primarily uses fear 
(Wodak 2015). Moreover, as one analysis of the scenarios of danger presented in US media 
concluded, “fear has become a dominant public perspective. Fear begins with things we fear, 
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but over time, with enough repetition and expended use, it becomes a way of looking at life, 
(...) a framework for developing identities and for engaging in social life” (Altheide 2002, 3).  
A central element of the politics of fear is the designation of individuals or groups of 
individuals as the enemy. This is effectuated by discourses that depict members of a social 
category – usually some kind of ethnic, religious, or political minority – as enemies, who, in 
the course of such process of enmification, are dispossessed of their human dignity. There are 
two modes of degradation: one is racism, which considers the enemy to take a human form, 
albeit of a different and usually inferior race; the other is dehumanization, which identifies the 
enemy as belonging to the world of animals and, more specifically, to dangerous ones. 
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a dehumanizing discourse developed that specified 
Muslims as the enemy and embodied the related danger in media accounts that sought to 
legitimize the Bush administration's foreign policy goals. In Europe, the Danish MP Pia 
Kjorsgaards identified Muslims as a “cancer” that was threatening Denmark (Steuter and Wills 
2010, 55). Sometimes the animals that are metaphorically evoked in the process of enmification 
are fearsome, while others are revolting and prolific, but their main feature is always their 
inferiority. The destruction of an enemy that is identified with an animal is not just a possibility, 
but an act that can be thoroughly justified in moral terms. If the enemy represents a disease, 
exterminating it is a responsible and logical reaction undertaken on behalf of other “humans”.   
Dehumanizing discourses are currently growing in legitimacy due to their appearance 
in politics at the governmental level. Michal Buchowski writes about the mainstreamed forms 
of Islamophobia in Poland: In a parliamentary speech in 2015, shortly before the elections, 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski warned that potential migrants posed a biological threat to Europe: ‘There 
are cases of diseases that have not been witnessed in Europe for long [for a long time], cholera 
on [a] Greek island, dysentery in Vienna, different parasites, protozoa’ (Buchowski 2017, 521). 
Buchowski continues by commenting that Muslim immigrants pose no credible threat to the 
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Polish economy or “culture” and concludes exactly what this paper also proposes: “...fear is 
generated discursively.” 
In Hungary, the discourse on security was instituted by a speech of Prime Minister 
Viktor Orbán about illiberal democracy that introduced at the same time the term “crisis.” 
Orbán claimed that the crises of the Western world are rooted in multiculturalism and 
permissive policies with regard to migration (Szalai and Göbl 2015). After sporadic comments 
by the government, the first coordinated form of action against immigration was the initiation 
of a referendum (a so-called “national consultation”) about migration and terrorism. This was 
followed by a series of appeals to collective anxieties and the state of exception, which included 
a poster campaign and the physical enclosure of the state through the erection of a 175-km long 
fence along the southern border of the country. Due to the border closure and the harsh 
treatment of refugees who became congested on state territory (which included criminalization, 
arrest, and show trials) there was a significant decrease in the number of asylum-seekers, 
followed by the nearly complete elimination of the infrastructure suitable for their supply and 
accommodation. In the spring of 2016, with almost no refugees on the territory of the state, the 
government initiated another campaign. The efficiency of this campaign may be indicated by 
the increase in the sociologically measured level of xenophobia1 – although the subsequent 
referendum 2  on the EU’s migrant quotas was invalidated due to the low turnout rate, 
representing a trend in attitudes that points in the opposite direction. By this time, nevertheless, 
the “migration crisis” or the focus on the “migrant threat” had become central to the political 
life of Hungary (Cantat and Rajaram 2018; Nagy 2018), leading up to the April 2018 general 
election campaign. Scholars (Bernáth and Messing 2016; Melegh 2017) have found strong 
evidence for the collapse of liberal-humanitarian narratives in Hungary and the development 
of a securitizing hegemony in comparison with the situation in other European countries. Based 
on comparative survey data, the extreme level of fear and the correlated high level of rejection 
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of migrants has been explained (Messing and Ságvári 2018) by a lack of social cohesion and 
inclusion, as well as material deprivation and the absence of social trust in Hungary.  
In what follows the relationship between the rise of a politics of fear and pre-existing 
social anxieties followed by the suspension of compassion and solidarity will remain the focus 
of analysis, but the topic will be examined from a different angle. Instead of looking at the 
structural factors affecting the politics of fear on a macro level, we monitor the construction of 
the hegemony of fear from a micro perspective, which a discourse-oriented ethnographic 
approach allows. In this regard, the paper follows in the steps of those anthropologists who 
have emphasized the significance of locality and observed the transformation that occurs in 
localities which are both physically and politically touched by international migration and a 
politics of fear practiced by far-right actors (Hann 2016, Feischmidt and Szombati 2016, 
Pasieka 2017, Thorleifson 2017) .  
 
3. The spectacle of border protection and the dehumanization of migrants in 
Ásotthalom 
Various sources indicate that the idea of the border fence that was built by the Hungarian state 
on the Hungarian-Serbian border was proposed by László Toroczkai, the mayor of Ásotthalom, 
who also confirmed this fact during our first interview. He acknowledged at the same time that 
the action taken by the Hungarian government ‘is correct; moreover, these are historical acts 
at a historical moment, when the Schengen borders must be defended.’ The main role in 
decision-making and the implementation of border control was occupied by state authorities, 
although some surveillance operations remained under the control of the municipal authority 
through the involvement of a local militia (polgárőrség), as well as the so-called “field 
watchmen” (mezőőr), a service created by the mayor that made him popular among local 
residents, as well as among sympathizers from afar.  
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During a village assembly in July 2015 which happened in the first days of my 
fieldwork and was attended by a majority of local residents, the mayor drew attention to threats 
concerning public sanitation. The representative of the competent authority made futile efforts 
at the meeting to reduce panic by emphasizing that no cases had been identified that indicated 
a cause for concern. Nevertheless, posters issued by the mayors’ office appeared throughout 
the settlement showing the hand of a leprosy patient, and the scene of a medical intervention.  
Because many local residents (but mainly elderly people and poor families) live in 
farmsteads that are relatively remote from the centre of the village, the mayor primarily built 
his communication strategy around their fears. Together with comments about a deteriorating 
sense of security, he argued that ‘this illegal migration is killing the settlement’ with regard to 
the technicalities of mobilization and the organization of defense. He further increased the 
visibility of the citizen guard and guardians of the fields – who patrolled in camouflage-colored 
uniforms – using a video distributed across social media. The video introduces the men and 
their assets, both appropriate for manhunts, in a style that bears a resemblance to and resonates 
with scenes familiar from Hollywood movies. In the video, the guardians of the fields and 
citizen guards are seen scanning the southern border from cars, horses, and motorbikes, while 
the village and its inhabitants are invisible. Indeed, the short, dynamic video quickly went viral 
on YouTube. In commentary published only one day after the online release of the video, 
Alfahír, one of the leading websites of the Hungarian extreme right, wrote the following: 
‘Toroczkai [the mayor] is receiving acknowledgement from all over Europe.’ 3 In less than one 
day following the release of the video it had been watched 150,000 times, which number 
rapidly increased, and the mayor claimed it had been viewed one-and-a-half million times in 
the interview that was undertaken in September 2015. 
The video became internationally famous under the title ‘anti-refugee movie,’ although 
its international reception was marked by negative as well as positive reactions, both of which 
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combined to make Toroczkai into an anti-refugee, action-man media star. Russia Today 
emphasized the mayor’s activities in relation to the impact of wars and starvation, also 
connected to Toroczkai’s earlier right-wing radicalism. From other parts of the Russian media 
the mayor received a particularly positive reaction.4 The British tabloid the Daily Mail, which 
has fostered its reputation in conjunction with Brexit, in spite of the subdued tone of the related 
article still provided space and opportunity for radical British right-wing readers to post 
appreciative comments about Toroczkai which are still available online.5 The New York Times 
published an article with the title “Has Europe reached the Breaking Point?” which analyzed 
the plight of the EU with an emphasis on uncertainties, and used the fence at the border as a 
symbol of European anxieties. Toroczkai (‘a rising ultranationalist star of far-right European 
politics’) is represented as a partly dramatic, partly absurd character.6  
Toroczkai’s reputation increased most dramatically after his participation on a TV show 
with a popular American political commentator. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver on the 
28th September, 2015 covered the issue of migrants and refugees in Europe.7 In August 2016 
the number of viewers of this show was estimated at nearly eight-and-a-half million. In this 
portrayal, Toroczkai is presented as a main actor in the industry of hatred. Nonetheless, John 
Oliver’s approach to the case also made the Ásotthalom mayor a ridiculous, even absurd figure.  
The most important pillar of political communication with regard to migrants in 
Ásotthalom is social media, as the mayor is in regular contact with his Facebook followers 
(their number exceeds 40,000). His communication is intense as he posts on an almost daily 
basis. In terms of this content regarding the settlement and his position as a mayor, the perennial 
topic of “migrants” is most common, whether the latter appear as sole items of interest or in 
connection with other subjects. To quote one of his “migrant-related” posts:  
... Recently I woke up twice in the middle of the night to the yelling of invaders at the 
fence of our farmstead. On the picture you can see our ‘catch of the week.’ Our field guards 
report more and more often that from the other side of the border fence migrants are 
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showing off their knives to guards, policemen and soldiers, and saying how they are going 
to cut off their heads. Then, if there are no guards, they immediately start cutting through 
the fence to rush towards the interior of the country. At the same time, we are now also 
many in number, and we capture and tie them up. The problem is that even if we stop them 
invading the country in an unchecked way by doing this, because of the insane laws, after 
fingerprinting and examination they are free to go after a couple of days. This is the 
responsibility of the legislators. So this  problem is still far from being resolved, even if it 
threatens our world. (FB, 24. 04. 2016; Translated by the author) 
In order to imbue this simple story with dramatic potential, a photo is added to the post which 
shows the mayor with his dog, while in the background we see a member of the citizen’s guard 
in a victorious position and a group of young men who have been captured. Some of the 
comments below the post praise the beauty of the dog, similarly to the comments under 
previous posts that included reference to the mayor’s pet. From comments about the dog’s 
condition the discussion is channelled towards its feeding, from pet food to refugees, and then 
back to the dog that is fed only with “quality pet food.” Between the commentators there is no 
debate. The peak of the series of comments involves talk of annihilation, followed by many 
additional emoticons (thumbs up, smilies, etc.). (‘It’s like tilting at windmills because even if 
you collect them, they will be strolling around again in a matter of a few hours or days. Boom 
in the head ... ☺ PS.: The dog is nice! ☺”’). The edge of the verbal violence is softened by 
humor, creating a mixture of hatred and cynicism.  
The de-legitimization of transnational solidarity and cultural diversity happens on the 
same social media sites that create a discourse about political enemies and place the national 
and international organizations that are dedicated to supporting the refugees within these 
frames. ‘The real terror just arrived to Europe, as I previously indicated, but only a few have 
taken me seriously. All the responsibility is on those moaning and horrified politicians who 
have been forcing and also who today force multiculturalism upon Europe.’ This statement, 
published firstly on Facebook, was repeated at the celebration of Independence Day in Warsaw 
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in 2015, where Torockai was one of the main speakers. 8 Concerning issues of foreign policy 
and Hungary’s relation to the European Union, his position and arguments are very similar to 
the ones used by the Hungarian government in the poster campaign of 2015 and in the October 
2016 referendum campaign. Nevertheless, with his international communication campaign and 
presence the mayor of Ásotthalom has managed to create and maintain his own allegiance of 
far-right political actors in the region and position himself as one of the major figures. 
As this section started, it also finishes: by pointing out the similarities between the local 
far-right position and the position of the Hungarian government concerning issues of migration. 
What gives the local far-right its legitimacy? A key factor is that Ásotthalom lies in the 
immediate vicinity of the state border where the border fence has been built. This is what the 
video shows, what the Facebook posts thematize, and what creates a border spectacle – as 
Rajaram and De Genova would call it; a term which scholars of migration have already applied 
to the European border regimes (Rajaram and Cantat 2018). The border spectacle represents 
the enactment of exclusion through the enforcement of a border which produces illegalized 
migration and illegal migrants (De Genova 2013). As we have seen, such spectacularization of 
borders produces two sets of roles: one of defenders presented as male heroes (Helms 2016), 
and another of aggressors presented as dehumanized enemies. How this border spectacle is 
produced in old and new (social) media has been shown in this section, while how it affects the 
everyday thinking and action of individuals is presented in a following section of this paper. 
Before this, the social and economic circumstances which determine the reactions of the 
affected individuals are described. 
4. Social anxieties and the demand for a politics of fear on the European peripheries  
The current mayor first entered the local political scene in 2013 as a young man with a personal 
affiliation to the settlement who was well known mainly from the radical-right. He won the 
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off-year elections for the settlement in 2013, a feat which he managed to repeat a year later at 
the regular municipal elections with the backing of the local electoral base of the previously 
national-conservative currently rather far-right populist governing party, FIDESZ. The ensuing 
radicalization of political views was widespread, especially among active young and middle-
aged inhabitants. The elderly tended to overlook the radical past of the mayor; his ‘social 
sensitivity’ and ‘commitment to the community’ (as it was formulated in our conversations) 
were deemed more important. For these reasons, he also enjoyed the support of local elites. His 
support grew significantly during the refugee crisis both in the village and nationwide. In June 
2016, Toroczkai was elected vice-president of the nationalistic and racist radical right-wing 
party Jobbik. However, after Jobbik significantly changed its position prior to the 2018 
elections by shifting towards a conservative mainstream stance with leftist elements, the mayor 
of Ásotthalom created a new movement (Mi Hazánk/ Our Homeland) which appears to be 
occupying Jobbik’s original far-right position, thereby handing the former party an advantage 
as it can now situate itself more easily in the middle of the political spectrum. 
In order to understand the support of the far-right and the politics of fear from a local 
perspective, in what follows we sketch out the social and economic circumstances which shape 
the everyday lives of the villagers. Ásotthalom is situated in the southern part of Hungary close 
to the Serbian border, not far from the city of Szeged. Almost half of the village’s permanent 
population is residing in the outer zone of scattered farmsteads (tanya), from where the 
infrastructural services of the inner zone are more difficult to access. The number of inhabitants 
residing in the outer zone is constantly growing due to the arrival of families, usually with 
many children, who, having fled the urban centers or post-industrial zones of the county, 
struggle to survive. Hence, the settlement had already been affected by migration before the 
refugee wave in 2015, mainly because of socially induced internal migration, but also due to 
the emigration of locals as labor migrants to various western European countries. 
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For half a century, local settlement dwellers secured their livelihoods through engaging 
in dual forms of employment in the industry of Szeged and other nearby settings, and in local 
agriculture. As the major employers disappeared and the demand for labor of the remaining 
firms decreased, most local residents were driven back to the land. However, the agricultural 
potential of the area is conditioned by the state of available land, which is difficult to cultivate, 
as well as the farmstead structure that can be made profitable only through a well-organized 
sales and marketing approach. During the last period of state-socialism, sales were made 
through state-owned companies, while cultivation took place in fields that were partly privately 
owned, and partly co-operative property. Following the post-socialist transition, co-operatives 
were created that could effectively sell the meat and vegetables their members produced to 
large shopping centers. However, this system had collapsed by the beginning of the 2000s. The 
immense storage units and cold stores that were constructed following the transition are now 
empty, and farmers are struggling to survive. In terms of sales, three medium-sized companies 
were left standing in Ásotthalom, but these pay very low wages, mainly on the basis of 
temporary employment. 
Accordingly, the fluctuation of the workforce is high: many residents, especially 
youngsters, look for work abroad, and the smallholdings that pack and distribute agricultural 
products mainly employ seasonal workers, a significant proportion of whom are also from 
abroad, either from Romania or from Serbia. Members of the active labor force are 
characterized by their low incomes, some of which is derived from the minimum wage – or the 
identical wages of “public workers” that is equivalent to 52-60,000 Hungarian Forint (HUF) 
per person per month (approx. 168-192 EUR) –, while supplementary incomes, also roughly 
equivalent to the previous sum, are derived from agriculture (animal breeding and small-scale 
vegetable growing). This has resulted in a significant decline in relative social status and 
position, as well as increasing insecurity in the domains of income and employment. An 
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important component of discontent is the nostalgia for state-socialism that is mainly shared by 
the older generation.  
The local government is currently the major employer in the village because, according 
to current Hungarian regulations, unemployment benefit may only be paid to those who are 
included in the public work programs that are funded by the state but managed and by local 
governments (Szőke 2015). The effectiveness of the public work system of the Orbán regime 
is highly contested by liberal economists, although some anthropologists and sociologists 
acknowledge that participation in public work supports the recognition and self-esteem of some 
of the poor (Hann 2016). Nevertheless, everybody agrees that the system increases the exposure 
of the poor to local power holders. This is clearly the case in Ásotthalom, where the mayor’s 
office disposes of about one hundred employees, including the well-known former leader of an 
opposition party. A similar situation exists with local civil society. Besides the small number 
of people active in the Catholic Church, only those ethno-traditionalist groups are visible in the 
local public that have a close relationship with the countrywide organizations of the radical-
right scene, again under the control of László Toroczkai.  
Based on fieldwork in a nearby settlement (Tázlár), in a recent article Chris Hann used 
the metaphor “overheated underdogs” (Hann 2016) to describe the social groups that have been 
plunged into a desperate situation by ‘post socialist semi-peripheral capitalism in rural 
Hungary.’ According to Hann, and in consonance with an earlier analysis of the Hungarian far-
right (Feischmidt and Szombati 2017), social anxiety and disappointment is a major 
explanation of sympathy for any sort of politics that operate using Euroscepticism, nationalism, 
and the treatment of foreigners as scapegoats. Similarly, Cathrine Thorleifsson (2017) also 
found that a precarious labor market is the major factor driving anti-migration sentiment in 
Hungary. On a larger scale, Melegh (2018) emphasizes the effects of increasing economic 
inequalities globally and within the EU, thereby producing “positional insecurity” in Hungary 
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that guarantees the success of a politics of fear because it promises to strengthen the relative 
position of the country.  
5. From precarious solidarity to fears captured by the far-right 
The current case study validates the aforementioned structural explanations and completes 
them with a thick description of how the social and economic insecurity of people living in the 
Hungarian border area were captured by the far-right9 both before and especially during the so-
called refugee crisis. In the analysis of the local public I emphasize the disappearance of 
alternative actors to those of the far-right, a lack of trust in other public actors, as well as the 
low level of social cohesion and inclusion. I document how the power of the far-right has been 
extended by their monopoly on the “refugee crisis” and through their creation of a hegemonic 
discourse. How this has affected everyday perceptions of people on the move, and how the 
reactions of the locals have changed over time are the subjects of this section. 
‘When there were fewer [refugees] coming, people felt sorry for them and helped them 
out as much as they could. But as the crowd got larger and [the locals] got weary of them, 
after a while they [the refugees] become more and more undesirable’ – my host, a woman in 
my age, told me on a late August day in 2015 in Ásotthalom. Her explanation for the initial 
compassion was that during the first wave – which residents identify with the winter and spring 
of 2015 – a smaller number of people arrived, many of them ‘well-dressed men,’ ‘presumably 
educated,’ and largely hidden from the public eye. In popular perception, the second wave was 
different, since by then it mainly involved the arrival of families, including many women and 
children. A willingness to help justified by empathy and civic responsibility manifested itself 
most intensively during this phase, which may be understood in terms of performative 
citizenship (Isin 2017). 
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 A local teacher described this period with unmistakable compassion in her voice: ‘I 
stopped [on my way] because it was so heart-breaking to see those people sitting there, 
crumbling under the freezing cold, and they just stayed there. I then discussed [the situation] 
with my colleagues, whether maybe we should bring them tea, and we should find out what else 
to do, that something must be done because this was frightening. Our doctor told us that he 
was called out to see a baby who was practically half-frozen. ... It was also said that one person 
brought along five others who were mentally ill because they hoped to get that status also for 
themselves, and so on. Apparently they carried everyone they could with them.’  
A young man related with a sense of curiosity about the summer of 2015 how ‘the 
whole world passed through the village.’ Due to this phenomenon, in his own words, he is now 
able to ‘orient himself much better in world politics.’ He has worked as a citizen (non-
professional) soldier for three years during which time he has also learnt English and partially 
also Serbian. Refugees regularly passed through his family’s garden, but apart from picking a 
few peaches they did not cause any damage. Family members were not afraid of them; they 
even took pity on them and willingly gave them all that they could. The young citizen soldier 
and the members of his family emphasized their good relations with the foreigners, and the 
normality of their everyday encounters. ‘I palled up with some of them, so to say ... we were 
talking, and it was all fine. He told me about his plan to move to Germany and that he wanted 
to work. Once we discussed the whole football World Cup with Kosovars, so it was something 
mutual.’ 
The local catholic priest defined his own position as an ambivalent one, which was 
reflected in his preaching, which I attended, and also confirmed in our discussions. The 
essential point of this ambivalence as he defined it was the idea that if individuals listen to their 
hearts or minds, or make judgments as Christians or as politicians, they will come to different 
conclusions regarding the international migration wave that reached Hungary:  
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People are concerned here ... While we are wasting [resources] on welfare states,  other 
countries are starving. It is understandable that if they cannot conquer us with weapons, 
they will do so without them. ... If we listen to our hearts ... we should turn affectionately 
to the poor families with many children. In other people we can see Jesus, who identified 
himself with us, human beings, so we need to help, since God entrusted us to each other ... 
[However] If we listen to our minds, it is the duty of the Hungarian government to defend 
our nation. 
The catholic priest resolved the dilemma for himself by helping refugees in the village 
personally but not asking others to do the same. The parish was open to refugees for a while 
and the church served as temporary accommodation for many families. Some of the guests 
were Christians, and according to the priest a few were even carrying the Bible in Arabic in 
their backpacks. Although locals usually described themselves as ‘churchgoers and 
conservative’ people, they did not actively host the refugees and help maintain the parish. The 
priest himself firstly became a hesitant but later a committed supporter of the mayor, and now 
supports him in relation to local politics first of all, but also concerning his far-right political 
ambitions at the national and international level too.  
In August of 2015, when most people were arriving, the focus of perceptions shifted, 
as one of my interlocutors formulated ‘...when they started to come excessively, by the 
hundreds, those 13-14 year-old striplings in gangs, we just sensed that this was a flood.’  The 
shift in perceptions can be associated as much with the transformation of framing. The effects 
of media accounts and local political communication were powerful enough to rearrange and 
supersede previous feelings of compassion and dispersed acts of solidarity. In September 2015, 
immediately after the border fence between Hungary and Serbia was built and the settlement 
ceased to be directly affected, local residents were claiming that they had had no personal 
contact with the people who had passed through the village and the area. To my question ‘Were 
there any instances when you talked to anyone?’ the most common response was something 
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like this: ‘I don’t really know about such things, but perhaps people won’t even talk about 
them. Once I was accosted by a man, but I didn’t understand anything, so I just moved on.’  
The local government prohibited personal contact with refugees. Moreover, retribution 
was taken against those who offered help. As one of my informants told me, albeit with some 
empathy: ‘A schoolteacher was coming ... by car and she took pity on a woman with two 
children, so she picked them up in her car. A policeman charged her with human trafficking; 
the court case is still pending. What she did, she did humanely, without accepting any money 
for it. Then what about the buses that transported them? Was that also human trafficking?’  
A couple of teachers at the local school were known to help refugees with food, water, 
or by giving them rides to the big city nearby from where they could continue their way by 
train. They initially had the silent support of the school management, which had once also 
helped distribute a big donation from abroad among refugee children and the children of poorer 
families in the village. Nevertheless, the school director was terrified by the thought that the 
mayor might withdraw his support for the basic activities of the school, which situation could 
have made the institution unsustainable. The director thereupon forbade any activity that 
involved supporting the refugees among the teachers, and also stopped talking with me about 
the topic. Nevertheless, some teachers continued their activities in the nearby city of Szeged 
where a group of around 150 volunteers helped the refugees during the summer of 2015 (Cantat 
2020; Feischmidt and Zakariás 2019). 
The retribution and stigmatization of altruistic supporters had the desired effect, but 
trafficking continued on a large scale. During my fieldwork I saw numerous cars waiting at the 
collecting point located in the vicinity of the settlement, and even in the village centre. There 
was a rumor about “Gypsy traffickers” from other settlements who said to be were regular 
transporters of refugees. It is noteworthy that in the Serbian village across the border, residents 
spoke about the transportation of refugees as a legitimate issue, partly as a service – in other 
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words, a business – and partly as a form of voluntary assistance that took various forms, from 
casual transportation to taxi-like operations. The “Gypsization” of transporting the refugees 
across the border from Serbia to Hungary was thus already part of the process of de-
legitimization.  
At a certain point, the initial diversity of perceptions and discourses completely 
disappeared. Narratives started to become increasingly homogeneous. Accordingly, highly 
selective observations came to fill out discursive frames: dominant themes included dirt, 
sanitary hazards, and the damage that had been caused.  
Someone’s electric fence was broken, ... And besides this, the heaps of garbage they left 
behind... It’s a huge problem, not to mention the risk of infection, the diapers  thrown away 
at the side of the road. Perhaps 40-50 percent of the people here live in homesteads and 
they don’t dare to go out into their yards. At night, people are  knocking on their doors. 
The sense of security ... Ásotthalom was a safe place. 
As communication and personal interaction became increasingly rare, the sentiments that 
villagers reported concerning foreigners increasingly included feelings of disgust, anger, and 
irritation. Dehumanization seemed to be the end result. Revulsion was further deepened by 
envy and suspicion: ‘How come people in need of help are able to run around with expensive 
smartphones, clothes and shoes?’ The increase in anger never led to physical assault, but 
aggression was expressed in verbal forms, as the following man reports: ‘Some were yelling 
from twenty meters ‘why don’t you throw bombs at them [the immigrants]?’ and ‘why don’t 
you shoot them down?’’ 
On other occasions, fear was explained by a lack of knowledge and information about 
the arrivals, who were criminalized similarly to previously existing categories of racialized 
Others, primarily the Roma:  
So many young men ... who knows what kind of skills they have with weapons or  stabbing 
... we are afraid, yes we are afraid. Now, if they are allowed to enter schools  among 
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Hungarian children, what will they take in there ... I’m afraid of this, or that I’ll be walking 
in the street and then, if they don’t like my look, they will attack me… Violence has 
occurred elsewhere.  
The analysis of public discourse and private talk led us to the conclusion that the hegemony of 
fear developed gradually, mainly driven by the media and political actors. As has been shown, 
the perception of migrants as a threat was due to the invention of far-right political actors for 
whom the border village, Ásotthalom, became a scene for enacting the protection of the natives 
and exclusion of migrants in various ways. The policing of the border and the spectacle of 
threats delegitimized the narrative of compassion and the local initiatives of solidarity. Those 
once supportive of the refugees became silent, or sometimes even supporters of the securitizing 
discourses. Locals’ own memories of flight which formerly aroused empathy – involving the 
villagers on the Serbian side of the border (Szerbhorvath 2016) and other border villages on 
the Balkan route –, were also silenced.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper commenced with a description of the everyday discourses encountered in the 
Hungarian border village of Ásotthalom that started with reflection about the various ways that 
migrants in transit on the Balkan route were perceived. Following this approach, the paper 
documented the transformation of the variety of discourses, which moved from mistrust 
through indifference to empathy to an emphasis on the fears and the insecurity of the village; 
a discourse dominated by stories and images fixated on threatening migrants. In the meantime, 
through the increase in media coverage, the border village became the scene of a spectacle of 
“migration crisis” and “border control.” In the construction of the border spectacle the major 
players were the Hungarian far-right and the mayor of Ásotthalom, but further political and 
media actors contributed to it on the local, national, and transnational level.  
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As the literature claims, this paper confirms that the far-right may increase its power by 
building on fears and showing its capacity to increase security by controlling national borders 
and by strengthening the perceptual boundaries between natives (perceived as people from 
Ásotthalom, Hungarians, or white, Christian Europeans) and people on the move (perceived as 
racialized or dehumanized Others). Migrants have been the subject of racist representations 
and dehumanization connected to othering that has recently affected other social groups in the 
country, most particularly Roma (Cantat and Rajaram 2018; Feischmidt and Hervik 2016), and 
Muslims (Vidra 2017).  
The paper also provides evidence for the synergy between the authoritarian government 
which makes enemies and security the main issue of governance and small, far-right initiatives. 
Our analysis was focused on local developments in the border village of Ásotthalom where we 
found that the far-right successfully maneuvered itself into dominant position by creating 
spectacles which came to be represented as actions of collective defense and the legitimization 
of surveillance, as well as by connecting the situation to the securitizing state. The 
interconnection of media and politics has also been proven. While protection and border control 
are presently the focus of governance, the media imaginary is focused on threats and follows 
the logic of dehumanizing migrants and abnormalizing both migration and solidarity with 
migrants.  
Finally, the investigation of the socioeconomic background of the current processes has 
shown the magnitude of social anxiety fostered by relative deprivation and the current 
peripheral position of the village both within the country and even more in terms of the 
European Union. The case of Ásotthalom is an example of the silent revolt of the people of the 
European peripheries against immigrants, and even more, against the transnational forms of 
solidarity promoted by politicians and civic activists, represented for the villagers by the liberal 
elite of Europe. The immediate reactions of locals initially included compassion and civic 
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responsibility. Nevertheless, such empathetic voices and solidarity action were not strong 
enough to counter the political actors who became interested in turning up the volume of fear. 
The case also shows that solidarity cannot become consolidated and institutionalized in an 
environment in which civil society is weak, the general level of trust is low, and the local public 
may be disposed of by political powers who manipulate existing social anxieties.  
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